World War I and the Relationship Between Germany and her Eastern Neighbors
The immense scale of World War I dwarfs that of most other conflicts in world history. Its resultant, World War II is the chief exception. Among the different theaters and fronts of World War II, the clash between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia stands alone in history as especially vast and gruesome. The Eastern Front of World War II is the apotheosis of modern total warfare. Over twelve million military deaths were suffered on both sides, and perhaps even more striking was the nature of the conflict, which saw fanatical war aims backed by deep-seated racial hatred.1 This “war of annihilation,” as Hitler himself called it, can be understood with a look at its origins in World War I. Unfortunately these two subjects have been unhelpfully compartmentalized as separate chapters in history.2 It is important to break this tendency and instead connect causation with climax in the enduring saga that is the relationship between Germans and their heterogeneous eastern neighbors. The purpose of this study, therefore, will be to demonstrate that the inhumane actions undertaken by Nazi Germany, specifically those aimed at Eastern Europe, were overwhelmingly influenced by the experiences of the Eastern Front of World War I and the broader racism of the Great War era.
As geographic neighbors the relationship between Central and Eastern Europe is long and deep. The crucial juncture of the eventual disastrous climax of this relationship, the Eastern Front of World War II, was the collective occupation experience of German soldiers in the occupied East during World War I. The Great War serves as the impetus for shifting German perceptions away from the perverted humanist view that non-German “natives” should be Germanized for their own good, into the Nazi policy of extermination for the purpose of land clearance. The perceptions brought in by the German masters of occupied Eastern Europe during World War I were dangerous in their own respect, and had it not been for the otherwise unimaginable experience of World War II, the former surely would have been more memorable to history. Germans looked upon the people of Eastern Europe as completely inferior and desperately in need of Deutsche Arbeit (German Work) as a guide to realizing their own native cultures in a productive way.3
The mindset of the new German masters of the East during World War I, derived its ideological foundations from the 18th and 19th Century German scientists, philosophers, and artists. Largely due to the philosophical contributions of Johann Gottfried Herder, who argued that every society owed its comprehensive identity to its mythology, German intelligentsia, building this theory, vigorously attempted to nationalize German philosophy and religion.4 By doing this, German intellectuals were bending German society’s collective self-perception closer to what it had been centuries ago, before the “corruptive” influence of “inferior” cultures. Herder’s general premise that a society’s own explanation of the nature of reality (mythology), before substantial influence from a dominant outside culture, did more to fashion that society’s “literature, religion, customs, law” than other factors.5 These efforts, therefore, led to a wide spectrum of results but the immediately relevant outgrowth was the emergence of the belief that Germans are superior in ever conceivable way; from intellect, to physical beauty.6
Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s Addresses to the German Nation evoked the triumph over the Romans during antiquity as evidence that Germans define themselves by defiance and their innate ability to will themselves to military victory. Fichte called upon Germans to come together as one ethnically superior nation-state and facilitate its own self-determination by any means necessary.7 Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel contributed his ideology that the State was above the individual. Hegel felt that obedience to the general will of the people, (in reality this meant any government who can claim such a mandate) was a moral obligation.8 Building on this, the later Volkish movement was the organized manifestation of such philosophical pondering. This movement can be characterized as a conglomeration of historical nostalgia, Germanocentrism, xenophobia, and ardent nationalism accompanied by the longing for a native mythical reification that would tweak or perhaps replace Christianity, considered foreign by many. 9
The German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche had an important role in the intellectual transformation from the development of what George Mosse called a “German Faith” to the racism found in the later volkish movement.10 Nietzsche had overhauled the idea of morality in his own mind. He subscribed to a nihilist, “might makes right” philosophy and denied any intrinsic benevolence in man. Nietzsche argued, “You say, a good cause justifies any war; I say, a good war justifies any cause.”11 In his work, The Will to Power, Nietzsche exclaims, “A daring and ruler race is building itself up… The aim should be to prepare a transvaluation of values for a particularly strong kind of man, most highly gifted in intellect and will. This man and the elite around him will become the lords of the earth.”12 Whether Nietzsche’s “lords” were Ernst Junger and his fellow Strosstruppen or Hitler and his henchmen, the manifestation of the historical implications his contributions had on modern German intellectual development is clearly observable in the conduct of early 20th Century German soldiers.
Rationally combining the potentially dangerous philosophies of Hegel and Nietzsche led to the unfortunate example of many Germans blindly following a state which owned no moral scruples beyond justifying its own actions with “might makes right.” The scientific modernization which accompanied the German movement to re-invent its spiritual infrastructure and self-perception fertilized the racist and morally nihilist potential found within. The work of Charles Darwin served as a legitimization for those looking for objective justification for such rationality. There is no evidence Darwin ever subscribed to Social Darwinism as he was drawing conclusions about species and evolution in nature, not the competition of human ethnic groups. But the phrase “survival of the fittest” corresponded beautifully into the already developing German Weltanschauung (world view) which linked the concepts to political relationships.
The leadership of the German occupation of Eastern Europe during World War I had been raised in a society in which all of the aforementioned ideas were omnipresent. In an episode of volkish-like nostalgia, Ludendorff reminisced of his time as leader of the occupation forces in Eastern Europe, “On the further bank of the Niemen there stands the tower of an old German castle of the Teutonic Knights, a symbol of German civilization in the East… My mind was flooded with overwhelming historical memories: I determined to renew in the occupied territories that work of civilization at which the Germans had laboured in these lands for many centuries. The population made up as it is of such a mixture of races, has never produced a culture of its own, and, left to itself, would succumb to Polish domination.”13 This quote shows clearly the perception held by most Germans that ethnic unity and identity was the essence of human existence. To imply that Polish domination would result unless German work was done is is to imply that peoples with national political realization are ethnically superior.
When Ludendorff’s comparatively mild ideals are juxtaposed against Hitler’s, the dangerous transformation that occurred between wars is elucidated. “There had never been spaces without a master, and there were none today: the attacker always comes up against a possessor. The question for Germany ran: where could she achieve the greatest gain at the lowest cost.”14 The climactic aggressor of Eastern Europe, Hitler, saw the world as “a jungle where the fittest survived and the strongest ruled. A world where (like Darwin applied to animals) one creature feeds on the other and where the death of the weaker implies the life of the stronger.”15 Hitler later jumped to the conclusion that,
“Thus for the formation of higher cultures the existence of lower human types was one of the most essential preconditions…. Only after the enslavement of subject races did the same fate strike beasts…. Hence it is no accident that the first cultures arose in places where the Aryan, in his encounters with lower peoples, subjugated them and bent them to his will… As long as he ruthlessly upheld the master attitude, not only did he remain master, but also the preserver and increaser of culture.”16
Hitler reinforces this attitude when questioned about the possibility of resistance from the current occupiers of the land he has earmarked; “Then the law of self-preservation goes into effect and what is refused to amicable methods, it is up to the fist to take.”17 He eventually mobilized over seven million fists for the task.
While Hitler’s perception of Eastern Europe was more violent and exploitative than Germany’s leadership during the Great War, the parallels between the two are crucial in the understanding the process of the transformation of Germany’s racial perceptions for their eastern neighbors. The perceptions of the occupiers of Eastern Europe during World War I were every bit as arrogant as Hitler’s but they approached the task without the extermination and enslavement of people. Instead, individuals like Erich von Ludendorff, had a much more idealistic approach. In his book, Ludendorff exclaimed that he “firmly believed that only the Germans would take so much trouble in a conquered country.”18 Here he was referring to the decision to research the native laws of Eastern Europe and translate them into German so that German judges could give judgments which he believed were fair and civilized.
“A great deal of the discontent that was apparent later was traceable to these inevitable military requisitions (taxes on cattle and horses for the occupied people.) Severities that occurred from time to time may have increased this ill feeling; they certainly did not harm. The political democratic agitators made it their business to add fuel to the fire,”19 Ludendorff commented. Here we see into Ludendorff’s perception of the occupation. Ludendorff seems to be genuinely considering his efforts beneficial to his new subjects. The Second Reich’s attitude towards Eastern Europe stood in stark contrast with that of the Third Reich’s; However The foundation for the Nazi perception can be found in the Administration of Ober Ost. In his work, War Land on the Eastern Front, Vejas Liulevicius argues, “In Ober Ost, General Erich Ludendorff… and his officials built a huge machinery of administration in the occupied territories, jealously maintaining a complete monopoly of military control. Ober Ost was to be the embodiment of the army as a creative institution.”20 German military tradition, which was a heavy influence on the administrators of the occupied lands, was to be manifested in the form of a “military utopia,” controlled by the German Army. This kind of utopia was essentially an administration which showcased all of the military doctrines and philosophies present in the German Army contemporary to the time
While the perceptions the Generals and high ranking officers brought into World War I are important to this discussion, the experiences of the German occupiers are perhaps more so. First impressions are very important. The German soldier’s first impression of Eastern Europe was that of a completely chaotic and uncivilized place. In his personal account, Lieutenant Ernst Rosenhainer describes his first encounter with newly occupied Russia;
“The civilians had fled; there wasn’t a soul around; every house had been broken into, and inside was total chaos. Outside in the yards there were individual pieces of beautiful furniture. Many buildings, especially the inns and the railroad stations, were gutted except for the walls… Most villages were ravaged and vacated.”21
German soldiers came into possession of a land that was intentionally ruined according to Russia’s practical and long standing military strategy of denying its use to the invader. But the condition in which the Russian scorched earth policy left the newly occupied lands did a great deal to artificially encourage the dangerous German perception of racial superiority. This logically set the stage for the transformation in German perceptions from viewing the eastern Land und Luete to Raum und Volk (spaces and races) the latter being ripe for Germanization.22 This fit perfectly with the warped philosophy of humanitarianism which justified imperialism and prevailed at the time. The resulting perception held that the eastern Raum und Volk was badly in need Deutsche Arbeit (German work) and more specifically Kulturarbeit (efforts to re-shape culture) which were intended to advance the quasi-culture native to Eastern Europe.
This chaos experienced by the Germans had more implications than those dealing with ethnic perception. The war effort was hampered which swiftly propelled the efficient German army to action. Germanization and military order went hand in hand. The German high command, chiefly under the personal direction of Ludendorff, decided to bring military order and stability to the occupied lands. The process of transformation starts from the practical purpose of securing supply lines and effective communication. Then, the military utopian idealism of Ludendorff takes over as “Ober Ost was essentially the feudal fief of the supreme commander in the east Oberbefehlshaber Ost vonHindenburg,
invested with exceptional freedom of action.”23 Liulevicius argues that the army intended to “create a state
after its own spirit.” 24 Administrative creativity, in part inspired by Teutonic themed nostalgia, but mostly inspired by simple racism, exponentially grew. The result of this was that, with regards to their administration of Ober Ost, German occupiers drifted away from military practicality and towards romantic idealism. The manifestation of this idealism victimized the native populace and permanently altered the collective German perception of eastern Europeans.
The first step for the occupation army was to eliminate chaos and establish order. This was accomplished with great effort, so much effort that the generals started thinking in more permanent terms towards the land under their control. By the fall of 1915 the emphasis of the administration in the occupied lands was shifted away from establishing hurried order and towards retaining Ober Ost under military control indefinitely.25 Out of this reorganization came the policy of labeling jobs intended to improve the occupied territories for the underlying purpose of long-term German exploitation as German jobs. This was done to establish the psychological concept that an “Order of Rule” existed.26 This order of rule proved to be an occupation caste system designed to train the natives to believe that Germans were their new leaders who would provide them with a better way of life.
During this “German” effort the pre-existing perception that Eastern Europeans were a lost people, badly in need of German Work was justified and reinforced. Ludendorff pointed out, “We confronted a population foreign to us, which was made up of different, often mutually feuding tribes, which did not understand our language and for the most part rejected us internally. The spirit of true and selfless discharge of duty, the inheritance of a hundred-year-old Prussian discipline and German tradition, animated all.”27 While there was an obvious effort to centralize the administration, local leadership had a significant free hand in deciding important policy.28 Liulevicius argues that this can be attributed to the aforementioned “Order of Rule” which already established ethnic Germans as authority figures. This parallels the nature of the German Army which was ahead of its time when it came to giving junior officers more freedom to exercise their own initiatives. This only reinforces the notion that the administration of the occupied areas was modeled strictly after the military.
In attempting to Germanize the people of the East, Germans began to draw contemptuous conclusions that would hold important implications after the war. Liulevicius argues that German witnesses to the nature of native land cultivation, which was lacking in thoroughness, led to the perception that Eastern Europeans were simply incapable of real work. Liulevicius even goes as far to say that the German witnesses viewed the “Peoples of the East [as] parasitic, incapable of real work, unlike ‘other more joyously creative and productive races.”29 He goes on to say that, for the occupiers, Eastern culture seemed to be “nothing but the night of apathy and the emptiness of the void.”30 Due to the strong causal connections, it is appropriate to interject a quote from Hitler made many years later. “It is inconceivable, that a higher people should painfully exist on a soil too narrow for it, whilst amorphous masses, which contribute nothing to civilization, occupy infinite tracts of a soil that is one of the richest in the world,” Hitler complained.31 What did Hitler want to do to correct this fateful discrepancy? Hitler commanded, “A permanent war on the eastern front will help form a sound race of men, and will prevent us from relapsing into the softness of a Europe thrown back upon itself… This space in Russia must always be dominated by Germans.”32 Hitler’s rationalizing that German’s should dominate Russia is not that far removed from Ludendorff’s reasoning that Russia needed Germanization. The failure to make Germanization permanent led the next Reich to rationalize a much more simple spectrum of solutions: enslavement, removal, or extermination.
The subject of hygiene strongly influenced the development of the German perception towards Eastern Europeans. The perception of a “dirty East” already existed to a certain extent before the war, but the German experience dealing with hygiene during the war exponentially increased it. In his work, Liulevicius presents a German official who recounts “Among natives, ‘hygienic conditions were completely primitive and the understanding of these problems and inclination to cooperate were in general absent.’ Sanitary Police measures evolved into a large program…. ‘Sanitary Police’ searched homes to see that they were clean.”33 Thus, the Eastern Europeans were being treated like livestock, perhaps worse. Ludendorff, tapping his superiority complex, later exclaimed, “the conditions of the land stabilized and life there returned to ordered courses. The German’s sense of order and his understanding of hygiene won through.”34 Germans started to consider their occupation of Eastern Europe as an act of cleansing. As is easily observed in Third Reich ideology, such rationalizing is ripe for Nazi perversion.
A further aspect of the occupation was the nature of the reorganization process. As mentioned above, the German occupation administration had begun to treat the occupied lands as a newly conquered permanent colony. The chief product of this process is the mindset towards and, thus, the treatment of the inhabitants occupying the land. The chief term to recognize, according to Liulevicius, is Verkehr, which means “traffic, movement, communications and relation…”35 The historical significance of this term is found in its broad application. The initial mindset may very well have been to improve the administration of the occupied areas, but it carried with it dangerous consequences with regards to the perceptions of Germans towards the occupied natives. As Liulevicius argues, human beings were beginning to be viewed and consequentially treated as objects of a task; that task being the tidying up of the East.36 “Cleaning” the occupied lands became the idea. Liulevicius discusses that, “Spaces had to be ordered, cleared, and cleaned.”37 This massive effort to overhaul the occupied lands turned violent and inhumane. This eerily resembles the totalitarian efforts of the Nazis to reshape Germany itself. As Omer Bartov states in his article, Social Outcasts in War and Genocide, “…the pre-condition for the successful conduct of such a war
[theoretical war of annihilation]
was supposed to be a massive purge of German society itself…”38 The template for such an undertaking is easy to find. As perverters of Hegel’s philosophy would argue, it is the only moral obligation of Germans to participate in what is considered good for the state then. Such dangerous logic, armed with tested and established Verkehrspolitik (reorganization/movement policy) opened the door for the horrifying climax of the 1940’s.
To effectively illustrate the massive energy that went in to transforming Ober Ost, it is useful to discuss the many administrative offices. The coordinated efforts of the press, political, school, and church sections of the administration went very far to mold Eastern Europe into an advantageous resource for the Fatherland. The press sections may have been the most significant, in terms of shaping ethnic perceptions in Germany. Their ostensible purpose was to advertise the benevolent “Deutsche Arbeit,” meant to showcase Germanization as a wonderful gift to inferior cultures.39 The chief effect they had, however, was to paint a picture of the East as a land of utter chaos with no hope of advancement on its primitive own. Public relations efforts also attempted to make the case that the natives of Ober Ost, had no unified ethnic structure. Liulevicius, mentions the Atlas of the Division of Peoples in West Russia, which was intended to ”spread the awareness that that state-structure, which before the war was considered a uniform Great Russian empire, is to a large extent formed out of territories of independent ethnicities, who do not stand nearer to Muscovite nature than to us.”40 This attitude hints that Eastern Europe was now “up for grabs” as many Germans already viewed political sovereignty and ethnic identity as mutually dependent.
The occupation of Eastern Europe during World War I saw a perverted humanist, “Germanic-Burden,” similar to Rudyard Kipling’s idealist world view. This Germanocentric Weltanschauung, however lacked the Third Reich’s addition– human extermination. The example of the Freikorps is crucial in the transitional process that saw the German perception towards Eastern Europeans immediately following World War I. The actions taken by and the political impact of this group of free booting, battle enthusiasts had a profound effect on Germany history as a whole, thus affecting German perception towards the East.
The formation of the Freikorps was not due to the mindset of those ideological mercenaries who eventually filled its ranks. This was due more to the threatening Bolshevik revolution, the lack of a sufficient regular German Army to act as a counter-revolutionary force, the presence of several thousands of unemployed soldiers lacking a bright future, and an anti-Bolshevik, acquiescent, middle-class. The world view of the individual volunteers of the Freikorps was however chiefly responsible for the paramilitary force’s legacy. As the strong arm of the counter-revolution in Germany during the collapse of the Wilhelmine Empire, the Freikorps had already established itself as a violent organization of bullies and hit-men. The Freikorps actions in the Baltic immediately following World War I serve as the final foundational preparation which paved the way for the especially heinous acts committed by the Nazi regime during World War II.
Many of the ideological and intellectual foundations discussed earlier come to the forefront in the discussion of the Freikorps. Nigel Jones, in his work The Birth of the Nazis: How the Freikorps Blazed a Trail for Hitler, describes Freikorps fighters as seeing themselves “The warriors who stood at Germany’s eastern gates [seeing] themselves as the heirs of the Teutonic knights who had carved out Germany’s eastern empire in the Middle Ages.”41 The members of the Freikorps, reinforced with knowledge of (or in some cases participation with) the experience of the occupation of Ober Ost were deeply indoctrinated with the perception that they vastly superior to the “untermensch” of Eastern Europe. However, instead of being instilled with the desire to re-condition Eastern Europe for German exploitation, the steel-hearted Freikorps were filled with anger, bloodlust, and a desire exterminate Bolshevism. As Jones puts it, “Whatever the mixed motives of the volunteers – patriotism, fear and loathing of Bolshevism or sheer greed for Baltic estates – they flocked to the colours.”42 The corruption of Nietzsche’s nihilism comes full-circle in the minds of the Freikorps’ fighters. As one of the fighters admiringly described his own unit as “Primitives… what in normal times would be called bandit-killers. They are men with no nerves and no moral scruples… just like nature… instinctively good and instinctively cruel.”43 Members of the Freikorps infused the dangerous irrationalism that had been lurking about the German mindscape for generations with the newly refined racist perception of Eastern Europe. This poisonous blend of ideologies was contextualized in the desperate political situation present following World War I, manifesting itself into a rampage of pillage and murder in Eastern Europe. A Freikorps historian interprets the later victorious Freikorps campaign in the Baltic States as, “The symbol of the victory of European civilization over Asiatic barbarism.”44 Nigel Jones evaluates the situation the Freikorps finds itself in; “The true essence of the Freikorps is here openly… exposed like a grotesque wound. The twisted paradox of a love of order as well as anarchy is frankly confessed.”45
As this paper argues, the ideological environment upon the advent of the National German Worker’s Party (later the National Socialist German Worker’s Party) was lubricated to facilitate its own brand of dangerous rhetoric. It is no surprise then, that Russia’s territory was now to be permanently in German sights. When at Landsberg Prison, in 1924, Hitler made his opinion of Russia’s destiny clear. In his autobiography, Mein Kampf, Hitler laid out the essence of his future foreign policy, “Territorial policy cannot be fulfilled in the Cameroons (commenting on the Kaiser’s strategy before World War I to expand in Africa) but today almost exclusively in Europe.”46 The fact that Europe was already occupied did not bother Hitler, “…nature has not reserved this soil for the future possession of any particular nation or race; on the contrary, this soil exists for the people which posses the force to take it.”47 Such unambiguous quotes make it clear that Hitler intended to invade Russia, his justification simply resting on the widely popular philosophy of Nietzsche; “might makes right.” The moment this sort of rationality was armed with the world’s most effective military and applied to Germany’s grand strategy, the stage was thoroughly set for what Hitler predicted as the “greatest battle in history.”48
1 Ziemke, Earl. Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East. USA: Barnes & Noble, 1996 pp. 500
2 Kershaw, Ian. Hitler, 1936-1945: Nemesis. New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company, 2000. pp. 339
3Liulevicius, Vejas G. War Land on the Eastern Front: Culture, National Identity, and German Occupation in World War I. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000 pp. 113-120
4Mosse, George. The Crisis of German Ideology: Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich. New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1964. pp. 57
5Williamson, George. The Longing for Myth in Germany. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004. pp. 1
6Mosse, George. The Crisis of German Ideology: Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich. New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1964. pp. 94-95
7Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Thirteenth Address, Addresses to the Gerrnan Nation, ed. George A. Kelly New York: Harper Torch Books, 1968.
8Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. The Philosophy of History. Trans. James Sibree. New York: Colonial Press, 1899 pp. 450-457
9Williamson, George. The Longing for Myth in Germany. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004.
10Mosse, George. The Crisis of German Ideology: Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich. New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1964.
11 Stone, Norman Europe Transformed: 1878-1919. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984.
12Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Will to Power. Translated and edited by Walter Kaufman. New York: Random House, 1968
13Bullock, Alan. Hitler: A Study in Tyranny. Rev. edn. New York: Bantam Books, 1961 pp. 273.
15Hitler, Adolf. Mein Kampf, trans. Ralph Manheim. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1971. pp 295
18Ludendorff, Erich Von. Ludendorff’s Own Story. New York: Harper & Brothers 1919. pp. 239
19Ibid. pp. 234
20Liulevicius, Vejas G. War Land on the Eastern Front: Culture, National Identity, and German Occupation in World War I. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000 pp. 7
21Rosenhainer, Ernst. Forward March: Memoirs of a German Officer. Tans. Hance, Ilse. USA: White Mane Books, 2000. pp. 18
22Liulevicius, Vejas G. War Land on the Eastern Front: Culture, National Identity, and German Occupation in World War I. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. pp. 20-21 and througout
23 Ibid. pp. 21
24 Ibid. pp. 21
25Liulevicius, Vejas G. War Land on the Eastern Front: Culture, National Identity, and German Occupation in World War I. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. pp. 55
26Ibid. pp. 58
27Ibid. pp. 59
28Ibid. pp. 63
29Liulevicius, Vejas G. War Land on the Eastern Front: Culture, National Identity, and German Occupation in World War I. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. pp. 70-71
30Ibid. pp. 70-71
31Rich, Norman. Hitler’s War Aims: The Establishment of the New Order. New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1974. pp. 329
32Ibid. pp. 329
33Liulevicius, Vejas G. War Land on the Eastern Front: Culture, National Identity, and German Occupation in World War I. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. pp. 80
34Ibid. pp. 81
35Ibid. pp. 89
36Ibid. pp. 104
37Ibid. pp. 106
38Gellately, Robert and Stoltzfus, Nathan. Social Outsiders in Nazi Germany. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2001. (Article written by Omar Bartov )pp. 296
39Liulevicius, Vejas G. War Land on the Eastern Front: Culture, National Identity, and German Occupation in World War I. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. pp 114-120
41Jones, Nigel. The Birth of the Nazis: How the Freikorps Blazed a Trail for Hitler. New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers. pp. 123
42Ibid. pp. 125
43Ibid. pp. 126
44Ibid. pp. 129
45Ibid. pp. 126
46Shirer, William. The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich. Greenwich, Conn. Crest Publishing, 1962 pp. 123
47Ibid. pp. 123
48Ibid. pp. 1101